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The Social Base of New Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia: 
Class Struggle and the Imperial Mode of Living
Wolfram Schaffar
► Schaffar, W. (2018). The social base of new authoritarianism in Southeast Asia: Class struggle and the 
imperial mode of living. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 11(1), 141-148.
This research note addresses the question of the social base of new authoritarianism and 
sketches out new directions for future research. In Europe and the United States, this 
question has led to highly controversial debates between two camps. One side argues 
for a class analysis and sees a revolt of the disenfranchised and poor behind the elec-
toral success of the right-wing populists. The other side draws on the concept of the 
Imperial Model of Living and focuses on a cross-class alliance in the North, defending 
their unsustainable consumption pattern, which rests on the exploitation of resources, 
sinks, and cheap labor from the South. It will be argued that a view from Southeast Asia 
– especially data from Thailand and the Philippines – has the potential to challenge some 
assumptions of this debate and add important insights. Here, a rising middle-class has 
been in the focus of the debate on democratization in the 1980s/1990s. Starting with 
the Asia Crisis in 1997/1998, the rise of the new authoritarianism has also been linked 
to middle-class mobilization. Finally, due to the proximity to China and historical links, 
the re-orientation of middle-classes towards China provides insights into the micro pro-
cesses behind the shift in the global economic system.
Keywords: Imperial Mode of Living; Middle-Class; Multiple Crisis; New Authoritarianism

THE SOCIAL BASE OF NEW AUTHORITARIANISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
By mid 2018, the authoritarian regimes in Thailand and in the Philippines 
appear fully consolidated. In Thailand, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha took over 
power in a coup d’état in May 2014. In the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte was 
elected president in June 2016. Both countries are important examples for the 
rise new authoritarianism in Southeast Asia because they put a spotlight on the 
social basis of new authoritarianism. What is remarkable in both cases is the 
role of the middle-classes in the process of toppling the democratic systems 
and consolidating the new authoritarian regimes. As of mid-2018, despite his 
record of over 10,000 extrajudicial killings, Duterte enjoys up to 85% support 
in the polls, with a strong base among the middle-class inside the Philippines as 
well as the Philippine diaspora abroad (Bello, 2018; Focus on the Global South, 
2017). In Thailand, the general support for Prayuth is most probably not as high. 
However, the middle-class was instrumental in ‘inviting’ the coup d’état in May 
2014 by mobilizations on the streets of Bangkok between November 2013 and 
March 2014 (Prajak, 2016; Veerayooth & Hewison, 2016).
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This directs the attention to the social base of the new authoritarian regimes in 
general. In Europe and the USA, a lively and controversial debate has evolved concern-
ing the rise of Donald Trump or the electoral successes of right-wing authoritarian 
populist parties in France, Germany, and other countries. The two competing inter-
pretations are potentially irreconcilable: One side draws on ideas from Hochschild 
(2016) and Eribon (2013), who see the base of new authoritarian regimes among the 
disenfranchised poor who are the losers of neoliberal globalization and who have 
been abandoned by the Democrat Party in the US (McQuarrie, 2017) or the European 
Social Democratic Parties (Sablowski & Thien, 2018). As Candeias (2017, p. 2) summa-
rizes Eribon (2013), “the electoral decision for right wing parties is an ‘act of political 
self-defence’ – a measure taken in order to appear in the political discourse at all, if 
only in the form of ‘negative self-affirmation’ ”. These approaches see a distorted class 
struggle hidden behind the xenophobic and nationalist discourse – distorted, because 
the elites which are voted into power by the marginalized poor effectively continue 
to pursue the same neoliberal policies which are the root cause for their misery. The 
revolt of the working class is described as a passive revolution. It stays conservative and 
authoritarian since it turns against migrant workers, LGBTIQ* and women’s rights, 
and since – despite of an anti-elite discourse – targets only state representatives and 
does not challenge the bourgeoisie (Demirović, 2018, p. 41; Sablowski & Thien, 2018).
This analysis is challenged by interventions like Silver (2016), Lessenich (2016), 
Brand & Wissen (2017), Eversberg (2018). Instead of a class conflict and passive revo-
lution, they see a genuine cross-class alliance with a shared interest as the social basis 
of new authoritarianism. Central to this line of reasoning is the concept of the impe-
rial mode of living – a heuristic concept and research program proposed by Brand & 
Wissen (2017, 2018a, 2018b, in press) which brings an ecological and global aspect 
into the debate on the rise of new authoritarianism. It highlights that the domi-
nant Western consumption patterns of the capitalist world – food, goods of daily 
consumption, patterns of mobility, communication technology – rely on unequal 
access to resources, sinks, and cheap labor in the Global South. On the one hand, 
the incorporation of increasing parts of the global population into these consump-
tion patterns stabilizes the growth-based economic system through the demand of 
consumption goods. The generalization of the imperial mode of living also has the 
effect to stabilize society through the hegemonic incorporation of large parts of the 
population into consumerist material well-being. On the other hand, however, the 
accelerated use of resources, sinks, and cheap labor – triggered by the generalization 
of the imperial mode of living – is the driving force behind the ecological crisis and 
the crisis of social reproduction. 
Eversberg (2018) and Brand and Wissen (in press, p. 1-3) use this concept to 
explain the rise of new authoritarianism in the Global North. They see the line of 
confrontation as mainly between industrialized centers of the North who are trying 
to defend the imperial mode of living in the face of the multiple crises which unfold 
since 2008. Rising external violence at the borders and internally against political 
dissent are explained with the increasing crisis-prone nature of the unsustainable 
accumulation regime. 
Some aspects of this debate are not entirely new: Sablowski and Thien (2018, p. 67) 
criticize that Lessenich (2016) and Eversberg (2018) replicate and radicalize Lenin’s 
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thesis of a workers’ aristocracy or an embourgeoisement of the proletariat. Based 
on these ideas, one should bear in mind that, in the wake of 1968, internationalist-
oriented activist scholars drew the conclusion that the revolutionary subject would 
have to be found outside the centers of the industrialized world. Consequently, they 
turned their attention to the revolutionary movements in the ‘Third World’ (Balsen 
& Rössel, 1986; Gäng & Reiche, 1967; Horlemann, 1968). 
How does this debate about new authoritarianism in the Global North link to 
the rise of authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia? The global view that Brand and 
Wissen (2017, pp. 95-123) introduce through their concept has two dimensions: First, 
a clear (conceptual) split between ‘North’ and ‘South’, in so far as the concept stresses 
that societies of the Global North draw on resources from the Global South through 
structural or direct violence. Another dimension is that the imperial mode of living 
– with its inbuilt tendency of generalization – becomes inscribed into societies of 
the Global South, too, especially in the dynamic capitalist societies of the Newly 
Industrialized Countries (Brand & Wissen, 2017, pp. 95-123, in press, pp. 1-2). Yet, 
Brand and Wissen (2017, pp. 109-110) also express their hope that new middle-classes 
in India and China will evolve as an emancipatory force, because they are exposed 
to the ecological consequences and the vicissitudes of this system in a more direct 
way than their Northern counterparts. Brand and Wissen (in press, p. 7) do stress 
that the situation is quite complex and concede that more research is needed. I argue 
that research on new authoritarianism in Southeast Asia is a promising field in this 
respect. 
MIDDLE-CLASSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Analyzes of the democratization in Southeast Asia during the late 1980s and begin-
ning of the 1990s heavily focused on middle-classes (Brown & Jones, 1995; Robison & 
Goodman, 1996). After years of economic growth – arguably a result of authoritarian 
developmental state policies – the People Power or EDSA movement in the Philippines 
toppled Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. In Thailand, the so-called Mobile Mob – Bangkok-
based mass demonstrations of people who were recognized as middle-class by the 
mobile phones they used during the rallies – forced down the military in Thailand in 
1992 (Anek, 1993; Callahan, 1998; Englehart, 2003; Ockey, 2004). The democratiza-
tion processes were seen as an empirical proof of modernization theory, according 
to which economic growth brings about a rising middle-class which – on the basis of 
their education, but also of their life-style which allows them to take an interest in 
politics – starts demanding political participation (Lipset, 1960; Thompson, 1996; for 
a different analysis see Ji, 1997).
However, in both countries, shortly after the introduction of a multi-party system 
and free elections, the same middle-class movements – often with personal continu-
ity of the leaders and, in the case of the Philippines, even using the same name – went 
against the popular elected governments. In 1999, the middle-class based People 
Power II or EDSAII movement forced elected president Joseph Estrada out of office. 
In Thailand in 2005/2006, activists who were behind the Mobile Mob in 1992 also 
were among those who mobilized against Thaksin Shinawatra (Pye & Schaffar, 2008). 
In both cases, the elected governments were attacked for being corrupt and populist, 
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since, in the wake of the Asia Crisis of 1997/1998, they promised the poor population 
welfare and social benefits (Aim & Arugay, 2015; Thompson, 2008, 2016). 
The concept of the imperial mode of living gives us a powerful tool to re-
conceptualize the orientation of middle-classes and its connection to class struggle. 
In the Philippines and in Thailand, the emergence of an urban middle-class the 1980s 
and 1990s can be characterized as spread of the imperial mode of living since their 
life-style rested on high consumption of resources and on cheap labor from the rural 
areas within the country – labor with predominantly informal forms of employ-
ment. When the Asia Crisis in 1997/1998 hit the region, this development was halted. 
Capital had to look for strategies to overcome the crisis and embraced different strat-
egies of externalization. In Thailand, migrant workers from neighboring countries 
– Myanmar and Cambodia – were recruited to the production sites to lower the wages 
further. By the early 2000s, the number of migrant workers from Myanmar alone 
reached one and a half million (Eberle & Holliday, 2011; Kaur, 2010). The Philippines, 
under state sponsored programs for Philippinos/Philippinas to go abroad for work, 
became one the biggest exporters of cheap labor themselves (Rodriguez, 2010). It is 
against this background that processes of de-democratization unfolded.
In Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra offered a growth-based Keynesian economic 
policy, with investment in rural infrastructure, social security schemes, and access 
to consumer credits. This “new social contract” (Hewison, 2006, p. 503) promised 
the poor access to and a co-option into what can be called an ‘imperial mode of liv-
ing’. It was the basis for Thaksin’s huge and continuing electoral success, but also 
the reason behind the middle-class mobilization against him which rejected this 
social contract and sought to defend middle-class privileges against the aspirations 
of the poor (Saxer, 2014). The Thai urban middle-class’ chauvinism is most clearly 
expressed in the discourse on alternative development paradigms. The poor in the 
North and Northeast of Thailand, who voted for Thaksin and his growth-based 
Keynesian economic policy, are blamed to embrace ‘unsustainable’ and ‘irrespon-
sible’ consumerism and are advised to follow a Buddhist-inspired middle-path 
idea of moderation under the guidance of the royal concept of sufficiency economy 
(Schaffar, 2018; Walker, 2008a, 2008b). This ongoing conflict culminated in an alli-
ance between the urban middle-class and elites to abolish the entire democratic 
system (Saxer, 2014; Schaffar, 2018). 
Sablowski (2018, p. 1) in his criticism of Brand and Wissen (2017) argues that the 
imperial mode of living should be seen as a life-style of the bourgeoisie, rather than 
as a mode of living in the Global North. In Thailand, there is no difference between 
the two views: The class distinction between the middle- and the working-class on 
the one side, and the distinction of life-styles between an imperial mode of living 
and the life of the poor (subsistence farmers and informal workers) on the other side 
fall in one.1 Moreover, spatial distinctions between consumerist cities (Bangkok) and 
exploited countryside (North and Northeast) are articulated along the same lines, 
too. What Brand and Wissen analyze as a North-South divide, in Thailand appears as 
a class division and a spatial division within the country. 
1 For a more detailed class analysis and a summary of contested views see Somchai (2006), Ji (2009), 
Naruemon & McCargo (2011), Walker (2012) and Sopranzetti (2012).
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The concept of imperial mode of living thus allows us to re-visit modernization 
theory and add the aspect of ecological limits of growth and the global dimension of 
the crisis. If the experience of Thailand can be generalized, the predictions of mod-
ernization theory concerning the political orientation of middle-classes have to be 
reversed: Under the impression of multiple crises, and due to the ecological limits 
of growth and the limits to externalization, a further generalization of the imperial 
mode of living and an incorporation of wider parts of the working-class into its con-
fines meets its limits within the country. The ubiquitous discourse on sufficiency 
economy and Sustainable Development Goals in Thailand shows that the middle-
class has a strong consciousness of ecological problems and of their own vulnerability 
to climate change and floods (Brand & Wissen, 2017, pp. 109-110). But contrary to 
the expectation of Brand and Wissen (2017, pp. 109-110), middle-classes in Newly 
Industrialized Countries – rather than becoming an emancipatory social force – seem 
to turn into a base for authoritarianism and fascism (Bello, 2018; Schaffar, 2018).
However, another dynamic can also be observed and needs further investiga-
tion: Obviously, the anti-democratic movement in Thailand not only consisted of 
middle-class people, but also comprised unions and workers (Pye & Schaffar, 2008), 
part of which were incorporated into the alliance through a nationalist xenophobic 
(anti-Cambodian and anti-Myanmar) discourse (Pavin, 2015). This points to an inter-
pretation along the lines of Demirović (2018) as well as Sablowski and Thien (2018). 
The trajectory of the Philippines, where President Duterte is supported by 85% of the 
population, demands for an explanation for this broad cross-class alliance, too. Bello 
(this volume) argues along the same lines and speaks of a passive revolution by which 
the poor are integrated into the authoritarian project of Duterte. However, he also 
points to a further complication: The vast number of Philippine migrant workers 
are known to be the strongest supporters of Duterte. Bello suggests analyzing their 
class-affiliation as two-fold: Frist, inside the Philippines, they count as middle-class 
in terms of their education, consumption patterns, and self-identification. Second, 
abroad they are part of a cheap reserve army of labor according to the kind of jobs 
available to them. This transnational electoral base with its ambiguous class affiliation 
provide a rich field of research where further studies are needed – studies bringing 
together debates in and on the Global North with debates in and on Southeast Asia. 
One more aspect of this empirical field is worth mentioning. Middle-classes in 
most countries of Southeast Asia are closely connected to urban overseas Chinese 
who arrived in subsequent waves and – after periods of political marginalization 
and even prosecution – today are fully integrated into the societies of the countries 
(Menkhoff & Gerke, 2002). The support of authoritarian governments in Thailand 
and the Philippines, however, coincides with the re-orientation of Chinese descen-
dent middle-classes towards China (Somsak, 2016). Kasian (2017) provided an 
in-depth analysis of the Thai development, where cultural and habitual orienta-
tion comes with a political orientation and support of authoritarianism. Kneuer and 
Demmelhuber (2016), however, convincingly show that the tendency goes beyond 
the Thai case.
This opens the question to what extent we can conceptualize the imperial mode of 
living as a ‘Western’ phenomenon only. As it seems, with the rise of China as the new 
center of global economy, a new, equally unsustainable, but ‘non-Western’ imperial 
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mode of living is gaining ground and is becoming the hegemonic base for the new 
China-centered accumulation cycle. Can we speak therefore of a Chinese imperial 
mode of living? Does it constitute a new and different pattern, or does it simply rep-
licate the ‘Western’ imperial mode of living, with different shades? 
In the Global South, the re-orientation to China – explicitly performed by the 
authoritarian governments in the Philippines and Thailand (Focus on the Global 
South, 2017; Jory, 2017) – is presented and legitimized by with a post-colonial (or de-
colonial) flavor, as a shift away from Western domination towards an Asian alternative. 
Sometimes this shift is even connected with the hope for a different, non-neoliberal, 
and more sustainable version of development (Hoering, 2018; Solmecke, 2016, 2018). 
It seems, however, that the heavily growth-based Chinese economic projects, such as 
the Belt-and-Road Initiative in its present shape, are as much a “false alternative”, as 
the Green New Deal2 (Brand & Wissen, 2017, pp. 147-164). The post-colonial pose of 
this turn towards China and towards a Chinese version of globalization, also serves 
as legitimization of the rejection of Western liberalism and of democracy as such. In 
the search of a progressive internationalism, this ideological cleavage will be difficult 
to overcome.

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